Japan’s Constitutional Constraints on War Rhetoric:
Analyzing Prime Minister Koizumi’s “Starting from Scratch… Again”
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1 Introduction

Prior to the First International Conference on the Reconstruction of Afghanistan in Tokyo 21-22 January 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro restated Japan’s experience and expertise in rebuilding a once war-torn nation in his article. The idea calling for diplomatic response appeared in the January 21, 2002 issue of the international edition of *Newsweek*, and in the 23 January 2002 Japanese edition. Titled “Starting from scratch…again”, the article suggested that direct participation in the ongoing air campaign in Afghanistan would be against Japan’s pacifist Constitution, but it would be able to take part in reconstructing the country. Taking the initiative concerning the “rebuilding” of multiethnic, war-torn Afghanistan, the Koizumi Cabinet sought more flexible expansions in military activities under the guise of “humanitarian intervention”. How could a situation be conceived and enacted so that Koizumi could use rhetoric and interpretation to allow certain degrees of military preparedness without modifying the Japanese Constitution?

This study explores how Koizumi contextualized Japan’s position in view of the exigencies of the ongoing war, and shows what Koizumi’s “full support for any U.S. action”, retaliation against the terrorist attacks, would mean in view of the country’s basic law.¹ As the Japanese Constitution of 1946 bans the use of military force, even in the exercise of collective self-defense legitimate in the Charter of the United Nations (UN) of
1945, Japan, unlike other powers, has been capable of making only nonmilitary contributions to the international community. In the article, Koizumi makes a diplomatic gesture by which Japanese humanitarian contribution neither lowers the worth of Japan as a member of the world body nor its contribution to the U.S-centered coalition. His call for “Starting from scratch… again” results from an effort to make a distinction between military and nonmilitary action in order to reach a national consensus on engaging in Afghan reconstruction projects. To other Asian peoples, Koizumi seeks to represent Japan as a responsible, democratic society in the effort to provide plausible remedies for reconstructing another country in need. To the international community in general, he makes Japan be seen as capable of rendering assistance and of being a good and safe global partner. To the U.S.-centered coalition, he provides a quick, strong response to the needs in emphasizing the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance in shaping the post-September 11 world. With a circumspect stance not to violate the Constitution’s war and military clauses, Koizumi described Japan as leading in active support for international peace and security.

What follows analyzes how and why Koizumi could be credited for gaining virtual approval from the international community in comparison with symbolic power of Koizumi’s war rhetoric, and evaluates the particular implications in which his socially construed reality designed to explain and defend Japanese politics goes against the constitutional war renunciation.

2 Analysis

The choice of a generic approach (Campbell and Jamieson, 1976 & 1990; Ivie, 1974; Simons and Aghazarian, 1986) to examine Koizumi’s article is based on three
related considerations: (1) the symbolic power of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution in 1946 that legally proscribes war rhetoric; (2) the importance of the rhetorical shift from the end of war to nation-rebuilding; and (3), closely linked to (2), the representation of international, especially American, interests in Afghanistan. Whereas the UN designates its members military contributions, Japan’s constitutional prerogative let it avoid such military functions without facing any international criticism until the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991. Since then, national opinion in Japan has been divided over the line to be drawn between humanitarian assistance and military involvement. From the international viewpoint, both are in the same category of international cooperation. In case of the Kosovo conflict, the allied forces began the air bombing campaign, claiming a cause for “humanitarian intervention” to save Albanian victims of the so-called “ethnic cleansing”. Using inspirational rhetoric, Koizumi represents a sense of purpose and influences the conscience of the country.

At the time of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, Koizumi publicized his perspective on the issue of post-Taliban Afghanistan prior to the Tokyo conference on January 21 and 22, 2001. Certainly, his strategic consideration of the constitutional constraints is reflected in the choice of his language replacing national crisis by moral crisis, and military involvement by humanitarian intervention. In terms of foreign affairs, the rhetoric of crisis undermines the deliberative process as a whole. In fact, its urgency often forestalls deliberation mainly because the use of military force is a life and death matter. Hence, the previous research done on the U.S. presidential use of war rhetoric to justify military force can provide useful guides for analyzing Koizumi’s rhetorical act that would take similar forms and strategies. His article contains at least three out of five elements of war rhetoric to make Japan’s commitment be seen as humanitarian on rational
as well as emotional grounds. Moreover, the post-September 11 context justifies Koizumi being the chief national definer to shape a context of interpretation that encourages responses “congenial to his purpose” (Zarefsky, 1986: 11).

2.1 The use of narrative

Like the second element of war rhetoric, Koizumi uses the best of narrative compatible with carefully developed arguments and evidence. While dramatizing a series of events leading to a decision, Koizumi plays down other historical events as Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945, its regaining national sovereignty on April 28, 1952, and its re-entering the UN on December 18, 1956. In the process of communicating with the foreign public, he attempts to promote understanding for the Japanese nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies.

Koizumi starts his article by his personal story of a war-torn Japan: “I was only 3 when U.S. air raids obliterated Tokyo in 1945. Since I was so young, I don’t remember the bombing or its aftermath. But I learned of the utter misery of that time from my parents”. Although he learned “the bombing or its aftermath” from his parents, he recalls himself as a victim of U.S. air raids. His personal storytelling ensures him a status of a war victim, and it turns to be more symbolically than materially true as he illustrates the horror and scourge of war with feelings of fear, sorrow, and sympathy.

More significantly Koizumi as the narrator of Japanese war suffering evokes sympathetic understanding of what happened to people and their land. His focus on his innocent childhood when the war came near to the end removes a sense of war guilt.

Whatever the causes of the war may be, Koizumi calls for deep consideration by claiming how similar the situation of the defeated Japanese and destructed Afghan peoples seem to
be. He first calls for Japanese memories, and then Afghan experiences of war loss in order to create a sense of togetherness. Hence his narrative tactic seems bent on effacing the colonization and aggression that took place prior to the outbreak of warfare. In particular, based on the situation at the war’s end, Koizumi represents Japan as a victim of fate for which it bears no burden of responsibility: “Japanese cities were once scenes of total devastation and wretched poverty.” By contrast, he emphasizes a strong sense of Japan’s own agency in recovery by drawing attention to the Japanese struggle and the success that resulted as the fruit of their hard work. In a sequence of narrative events, Koizumi could keep silent on reconciliation with Japan’s victims who still hold anger toward Japan for colonizing Asia and waging war.

The different perspectives of his justification for Japan’s victim consciousness are illuminated by a Burkean analysis. Namely, the dramatistic analysis views language as a series of terministic screens through which we see the world because of the selecting and deflecting properties of language (Burke, 1966). How does Koizumi direct attention away from aggression and direct attention toward victimization in emphasizing Japanese nation-rebuilding? By passing the contemporary critical need for providing an accurate record of the war, Koizumi focuses primarily on outcomes like act, scene and agency, but avoids specifying agent and purpose. For example, prior to referring to international support for rebuilding Japan, he underlies the blame on those benefactors of having used excessive war powers. Thus, Koizumi describes the scene of obliterated major Japanese cities such as Tokyo in 1945; the act of U.S. air raids by which the residents of those cities were evacuated or eradicated; and the agency, the bombing, a lethal force that was intended to destroy an entire city. As a result of avoiding the purpose of the missing agents, Koizumi’s narrative overlooks American war responsibility.
In these regards, the Burkean approach reveals another missing link in the historical account – what happened in an Asian context. By highlighting the scourge of war, comparing Japan in 1945 with Afghanistan today, Koizumi effaces the scene of Japanese colonial imperialism named the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere”. In his flashback narrative, he puts a great emphasis on the domestic Japanese scenes of suffering, and calls forth the acts of U.S. carpet bombings to legitimate Japanese victim consciousness, and even cultural amnesia.

Koizumi ends his flashback by expressing his country’s appreciation as well as calling for international generosity toward another war-torn country: “Japanese citizens relied on their own efforts to rebuild their country from the ground up – but the support the international community provided to the Japanese people helped speed that recovery. Now, in Afghanistan, another war has essentially come to an end”. Koizumi mentions Japanese indebtedness to international aid in consolidating peace after a long spell of war, and then compares the task of rebuilding Japan to that of rebuilding Afghanistan in the post-September 11 context. Whereas defeated Japan complied with the terms of surrender and acquiesced to the U.S.-led military occupation, Afghanistan has not yet been “defeated”. It is still contesting the country’s leadership in terms of dealing with the U.S. military presence – what extent to admit the national government backed by the U.S. Here, by historical analogy, Koizumi shifts the Japanese stance from that of victim to that of benefactor. While recasting Japanese nation-rebuilding in the minds of his national and international audiences, he envisions the reconstruction of an Afghan nation as a shared future.

To reconstitute a national subjectivity anew, postwar Japan chose to live under the American tutelage in which the defeated Japanese would conform to the American
modernity’s hold on national consciousness. This choice was a convenient way for the Japanese government to efface the country’s colonial guilt and war responsibility in the aftermath of the war, because the milieu of the rising scourge of demoralization, “kyodatsu” (Dower, 1999: 59-74), was imperative to convince the country of seeing the surrender not as the loss of its colonial territories, but as the advent of its (not political but psychological) liberation from the military dictatorship. On the other hand, the profound influence of the U.S.-led military occupation (1945-1952) remains in the way in which the Japanese government has interpreted the Constitution that restricts Japanese military capabilities. For Americans, postwar Japan is their “good war” model (Terkel, 1984). This model maximizes the American desired result such as a greater sense of a “can do” generation, while minimizing undesired collateral effects called “combat exhaustion” or “battle fatigue”, whenever it uses its military on foreign soil (Adams, 1998). For the international community, postwar Japan is an exemplar of nation-rebuilding and, to them, this success, to a certain extent, legitimizes the supremacy of ideals like American democracy and liberation. Therefore, postwar Japan is used to support the claim that the international community should commit itself to nation-rebuilding in Afghanistan.

2.2 Exhortation to Commitment

The third element in using war powers, exhortation, comes in two steps in Koizumi’s article. His justification for asking for international cooperation in antiterrorist efforts is embodied in a dramatic narrative from which, in turn, the argument is extracted. That argument claims that a threat imperils the international community, indeed, its faith in the dignity and worth of the human person. In the exhortation to intense commitment, thoughtful consideration must lead not only to a rational decision but to unified action.
First, Koizumi’s narrative, filled with emotionally loaded language, sets the stage for this process. Next, rhetoric using moral preaching exhorts the international community to respond with unanimity, to stand up for humanity, and to disseminate democracy. Central to this crisis rhetoric is postwar Japan that symbolizes obligation to and reward for “the creation of a secure and stable society inhospitable to Osama bin Laden and his kind”.

For the sake of a public relations posture, Koizumi restates Japanese appreciation for the international community, and then shifts his focus to calling for rebuilding another “Japan” since “another war has essentially come to an end”. The phrase “from scratch” in the title, “Starting from scratch… again”, brings both national and international readers to an equal footing with one another. After embracing them in the inclusive “we”, Koizumi encourages “us” to work together for the creation of a “secure and stable” Afghanistan. Moreover, the ending adverb “again” assures “our” pledges to restore “a vivid, multifaceted cultural tradition” in Central Asia, making a comparison to Japan’s postwar peace and prosperity. Furthermore, Koizumi emphasizes that his Cabinet is “consulting with the interim government in Kabul” over “the development of a comprehensive health, education, demining [i.e., digging out mines] and refugee-resettlement plan” in order to put the pledge into action. In doing so, he draws attention to the ongoing Japanese involvement in “aid efforts on the grass roots” level in Afghanistan.

While finding the past in the present, Koizumi also makes metaphorical use of postwar Japan in a geographical as well as temporal perspective. Such contrastive references as “there” versus “here”, and “then” versus “now” creates symbolic relations between Japan, Afghanistan and the international community, and also between “World War II”, “1945”, “half a century ago” and “September 11”. The link of defeated Japanese
to war-torn Afghan people is in the scene of “total devastation and wretched poverty”, and becomes materialized by the two photographs captioned “Tokyo in 1945” and “Kabul today”. These comparative as well as contrastive photographs are in the middle of the one-page article. Koizumi provided a visual comparison between obliterated Tokyo in 1945 framed in the black-and-white photograph above and Kabul today in the colored photograph below. Regardless of their contrastive points, viewing the photographs promotes shared understandings of the “severity and scale of destruction inflicted upon” Japan and Afghanistan.

Koizumi expresses his hope for international cooperation in Afghan nation-rebuilding with reference to the optimistic atmosphere surrounding the breakdown of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. In the later half, he emphasizes that people came closer to one another beyond the national borders: “The 1990s brought a great coming together of the world. … More and more, the fates of human beings are moving in concert”. His support for such a cosmopolitan move results in claiming that “[we] cannot let September 11 reverse this positive trend”. Here the inclusive “we” stands for the integrity of the international community in opposition to “the terrorists” who committed suicide attacks on the WTC towers. Even in the framework of “we” versus “they”, however, Koizumi presents a channel open for dialogue by calling terrorism “tragedy”. In an international light, such geographical and temporal comparisons between Tokyo in 1945, Kabul today, and New York on September 11 in 2001 integrate Japan, Afghanistan, and America into the one – innocent victims. Asking for reciprocity, he then turns international sympathy into support for the peoples of those three countries.

In such extended analogies, Koizumi describes a threat that imperils the sort of cherished international faith expressed and reinvigorated throughout his address.
Moreover, the threat imperils the continued existence of worldwide “interconnectedness”. Koizumi perceives “a framework built upon international cooperation” as a united community of peoples. After the extended analogies, he draws these conclusions:

“The international community must avoid the temptation to accept a halfway solution for the country which slaps a bandage on its worst problems and gives up on the rest. … It would compound tragedy if the fear of terrorism were to tempt each country into going its own way, rejecting a framework built upon international cooperation.”

At the end of his article, Koizumi then reiterates the most recent past in the present to bespeak the rightness of international action on the challenges of the post-September 11 world: “An international effort helped rebuild Japan after World War II. Now the world owes Afghanistan the same opportunity”. Along with historical progressivism, his faith in the equal rights of nations large and small as well as human rights is forecast in the following: “Now I ask the international community to work together to give Afghanistan the same chance my country received half a century ago – the chance to make good on the promise that lies within all humankind”. By giving the specific case of rebuilding the Japanese nation, Koizumi conforms to the basic line of a story in which the international community is to provide the same support as Japan experienced and remembered, thereby ascribing a successful Afghan nation-rebuilding. Grounded on such historical analogies, Koizumi binds war-torn Japan and present Afghanistan together so as to project the world security and stability of the postwar context onto a secure and stable world in the post-September 11 context.

Koizumi also used the same tone in his opening speech at the Tokyo conference on January 21, 2002. In English, he expressed appreciation to the international community for facing up to the challenges “to eliminate conditions that allow terrorism to take root” (Daily Yomiuri, January 22, 2002: 1). In his call for “Starting from scratch
again…” publicized prior to the peace conference, he had already announced as priority areas of Japanese aid the promotion of education for children, public health and medicine, and support for Afghan refugees who were returning to the country. While asking for a peaceful resolution of the crisis, Koizumi uses a rhetoric of immediacy to identify the threat to the international community with the challenges of the post-September 11 world.

2.3 Strategic Representation

The final characteristic of war powers rhetoric is strategic misrepresentation. Koizumi misrepresents the events in order to maintain the distinction between the constitutional constraints on military operations and Japan’s international obligation in the post-September 11 world. That tendency reflects both the national character and the rhetorical situation related to international cooperation. To create the “right” first impression, Koizumi seeks a degree of support that is acceptable in the international as well as the national sphere. In other words, he preempts the constitutional constraints through misrepresentation, for example, by transforming his narrative justifying Afghan nation-rebuilding into melodrama “to the ends of the world”. The thoughtful consideration upon which this rhetoric is based entails carefully weighing the evidence by selecting or creating a critical perspective, and examining competing claims and alternatives to generate international action.

In the post-September 11 context, Japan has been in the most “uncomfortable” of positions among the world powers in terms of making clear its willingness to fight terrorism, mainly because its Constitution allows no military involvement on foreign soil. A promising way left for Japan is to play a peacekeeping role commensurate with its stature in the international community. In other words, Koizumi seeks to make Japan’s
commitment to the “Afghan Reconstruction” the same as a commitment to the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, underlying the cooperation extended by the so-called Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to the U.S. military campaign. He needs to balance the ensuring the SDF’s engagement under the Antiterrorism Law, confirming the Japan-U.S. alliance, and reassuring Asian neighbors of no expanded military ambitions.

Koizumi links the Afghan reconstruction to the global war on antiterrorism. He remarks on “the horror of September 11” in the last two paragraphs of his address: “I have stood at Ground Zero, dumbstruck and outraged. The world was astounded by the horror of September 11 and in reaction it came together one”. On the other hand, Koizumi identifies the WTC towers in New York with “Ground Zero”, implying that Japan stands with the U.S. In fact, on September 25, 2001, Koizumi opened his speech in English alongside President Bush in the Rose Garden to issue their joint declaration: “We Japanese humbly stand by the United States” to fight terrorism “with determination and patience” (Daily Yomiuri, October 3, 2001: 12). On the other hand, the term “Ground Zero” is a military reference to the point at which the explosion of a missile occurs. In that framework of a war metaphor, he seeks to make Japan’s leading humanitarian action in Afghan nation-rebuilding comparable to U.S.-led military retribution for Afghanistan.

Koizumi’s identification of the WTC towers with Ground Zero brings about another historical analogy. Before September 11, 2001, this military term was only used as reference to the a-bombed twin cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki, more specifically to their atomic epicenters. Since the moment of the attacks on U.S. soil, the American media started to call New York Ground Zero. On the one hand, this redefinition reminds a few Americans of the American war guilt of dropping the atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945. A few weeks after the September 11 attacks, an
interviewed American female, who lived in New York, said that the land where the WTC
towers used to stand should not have been called Ground Zero since that expression was
appropriate only to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. During the interview, she also demanded
the American government to investigate why the attacks had occurred (Hamada, 2002).
On the other hand, the mass media highlights the breakout of a new war by saying
“Remember Nine Eleven” which soon recalls another wartime slogan “Remember
Alamo!” in 1846, “Remember the Maine!” in 1898, and “Remember Pearl Harbor!”
in1941, thereby wiping out the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In addition, the
archaic Japanese loanword “KAMIKAZE”, instead of the familiar word “terrorist”,
appears as the headline of American popular newspapers with the photograph of the
moment that the airplanes had crashed into the WTC towers, so that the terrorist actions
become associated with Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor, both of which were surprise
attacks on U.S. soil (Zarefsky, 2004). Such news coverage renews the hostilities, and
courages American people to forget their past war crime, to consider themselves
victims, and to support their government.

The September-11 attacks and the subsequent U.S. military deployment in
Afghanistan led Japan to recall the international criticism of its “too little, too late”
support for the U.S.-centered multinational forces against Iraq in the Gulf crisis, and soon
Japan dispatched its SDF personnel to support the U.S.-centered coalition five days
before the Diet passed the bill on November 30, 2001.6 Something that had not been done
during the postwar era marked a significant turning point for Japanese national security
policy. Primarily, the bitter memory of its failure led Japan to mistake the message of U.S.
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, “Show the flag”, as the U.S. demands for its
logistics support.7 Showing its understanding of the Japanese constitutional constraints,
the Bush Administration asked Japan to make a visible contribution in the spheres of politics, diplomacy and economy, but did not expect any substantial contributions in the areas of collective action and armed control. Moreover, the decisive step to dispatch SDF troops to foreign soil was merely one of the possible measures in the eyes of Americans and Europeans. On the other hand, this move by the Koizumi Cabinet seemed to be of unusual significance in the eyes of Japanese as well as other Asian peoples. Most of them believed that Japan should not ignore its basic law, and particularly Japanese were concerned about the abuse of their Constitution as well as the upsurge of Asian protest.\(^8\) Such a difference between Euro-American and Asian reactions casts light on different collective remembering.

Whereas the Western victors call World War II a “good war” (Terkel, 1984), the same war recalls “hidden horrors” among those colonized Asians oppressed under the imperial Japanese military regime (Tanaka, 1996). It was the post-September 11 context that demanded Japan to face the critical question of whether Japan could succeed in winning trust in its foreign policy among its Asian neighbors in order to set about rearmament (e.g. Daily Yomiuri, January 15, 2002: 8). The People’s Republic of China continued to be wary of Japan as it adopted an assertive new military stance in the name of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, whereas such Asian criticism might be seen as interference in Japan’s internal affairs in the Euro-American view. In this situation, the Koizumi Cabinet started to reshape the Japanese decision to support the U.S. forces as an ally under the Japan-U.S. alliance into “humanitarian, international relief activities” under the UN Peacekeeping Activities Cooperation Law (Daily Yomiuri, October 23, 2001: 1). Holding onto the unchallenged conventional interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution as a comfort and consolation for Japan’s strained relations with Asian
countries, Koizumi yet shifted its diplomatic and security measures from self-defense to “humanitarian intervention”.

While justifying the Japanese resolution on Afghan issues, Koizumi sought to circumvent actual military intervention and to preempt any national and international dissent by emphasizing “humanitarian intervention”. Focusing on the shaping of world opinion, he brought about an emotional reaction in time of conflict, and thus unified the country as well as the world for immediate and sustained action. In the manipulation of facts that suppressed dissent, the rhetoric of immediacy allowed Koizumi to call for unity, friendship, and progress in resolving conflicts as the best way to respond to an unavoidable threat in the post-September 11 context.

3 Conclusion and Critical Implications

In contrast to the crisis of the Gulf conflict in 1991, the international community acknowledged as well as welcomed Japanese contributions to the U.S.-led invasion in Afghanistan. The U.S. officials gave credit to Japan’s diplomatic efforts such as passing a contingency law for the SDF logistic support for the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan (Daily Yomiuri, February 9, 2002: 1 & September 11, 2002: 2). In addition, President Bush repeatedly expressed gratitude for a series of decisive commitments taken by Prime Minister Koizumi (Daily Yomiuri, February 14, 2002: 1 & March 5, 2002: 9). From the perspective of peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region, however, Asian anxiety about the rise of Japanese militarism, given the wartime Japanese military roles and actions, left Japan in a quandary. In hindsight, the symbolic powers of Article 9 were challenged, and its legal enforcement was entirely lost. Recognizing the military implications and the risk of postwar constitutional policy, Koizumi sought to present an
all-encompassing international peace conference as equivalent to the U.S.-declared war on terror since both actions aim at salvaging human lives and property.

In Koizumi’s article, “Starting from scratch… again”, postwar Japan embodies the American narrative that democracy plays a fundamental role in modernizing a war-torn country. In the eyes of Japanese and Americans, the argument from analogy based on postwar Japan thus reaffirms their belief in Asian modernization that could be accomplished only by appropriating the essence of Western modernity – the invention of a united nation. More precisely, the territorial integrity and the imagined unity of the nation could be reached only in the shaping of people(s) into “the nation”. In the name of the people, race, or nation, modernity has been understood to be something that continually spread from the West to the rest of the world. In due course, modernity as a consequence of social transformation is supposedly to progress in the single overarching process of globalization (Sakai, 2000). In this process, Koizumi represents postwar Japan as the outcome of America’s mission to spread democracy far and wide by force of arms, if necessary, on faith in American exceptionalism.

Historical analogies grounded on postwar Japan also justify Japan’s financial and technical contributions as appropriate to the framing of foreign perceptions and their effect on the making of Japan’s foreign policy. It is such an insurance policy as long as the country is in compliance with its impartial obligations to the international community, and thus the timing of Koizumi’s call for international cooperation was important for public diplomacy. He contended that the speed of communications and, hence, of actions requires swift, unilateral responses to the ongoing war in Afghanistan. His article was in the international edition of Newsweek issued on the opening day of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Conference in Tokyo. As his call for international cooperation and the
opening of the international conference were on the same day, his request was to be met almost simultaneously. In addition to this immediacy, he reminded his readers of the accomplishment of Japanese nation-rebuilding. This shared historical memory encouraged them to challenge the task of turning war-torn Afghanistan into a second Japan. By taking pro-democracy initiatives, Koizumi sought to symbolize Japan as a leading country of stabilizing post-Taliban Afghanistan.

In his English article on the post-September 11 stage, Koizumi attempted to frame Japan’s military involvement in the only appropriate response to an imperiling threat under the guise of humanitarian intervention. Although the events that lead to the use of war powers are concrete and time bound, human rights must be defended over time. The tone of his rhetoric is thus exhortative, calling both on the country and on the world to put aside dissent and unite in committing themselves to protect such fundamental human rights. It is also a rhetoric of immediacy like the U.S. presidential war rhetoric – calling for swift action. At the center of Koizumi’s article is a narrative simplifying and dramatizing the events that constitute the ongoing war on terror. While deliberating in act and judgment, he exhorted national and international readers to act as leading agents to preserve their own “inalienable rights”. Asking for such unanimity of commitment and action eventuates in humanity, and thus helps Japan’s wish to cooperate by deploying a mission to Afghanistan.
NOTES

1 On September 13, 2001, in talks with President Bush by telephone, Prime Minister Koizumi promised to spare no efforts to assist any U.S. action.

2 In Campbell and Jamieson (1990) study, they discuss that the provisions of the U.S. Constitution, Articles 1 and 2 in particular, giving Congress the power to declare war and making the President the commander-in-chief of the military resulted in a “rhetorical genre justifying military action by the executive” (102). Their examination of presidential war speeches revealed five key characteristics: (1) every element in war rhetoric proclaims that the momentous decision to use force derives from thoughtful consideration; (2) forceful intervention is justified through a narrative from which argumentative claims are made; (3) the audience is exhorted to unanimity of purpose and total commitment; (4) the rhetoric not only justifies the use of force, but also seeks to legitimate the exercise of the presidential powers as the commander-in-chief; and (5) strategic misrepresentations play an extraordinary important role (105). In so far as presidential war rhetoric is discourse justifying “the introduction of United States armed forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances” (101), the central focus will be on the justification and legitimacy of going to war.

3 The mass media called the bombing the “air strike,” and avoided using the term “air raid” that would remind some people of war loss during World War II. Also, this redefinition could deflect the damage inflicted on people – casualties – in conforming to a point of view from the sky.

4 All the quotations of Junichiro Koizumi’s article in this paper are from his English written text in the January 21, 2002 issue of Newsweek [International ed.].

5 The antiterrorism law along with a revised bill of the Self-Defense Forces Law and a revise bill of the Japan Coast Guard Law allows the SDF to offer logistic support in such fields as transportation, medical services, aid to refugees, and intelligence activities.

6 Koizumi proposed a contingency law which passed the Diet on October 29, 2001, and thereby presented Japanese willingness to observe the Japan-U.S. alliance in the name of a secure and stable world.
Since 1947, the Constitution of Japan has prohibited the country from using armed forces, including any involvement in collective self-defense action. This constitutional block led Japan to be criticized, because the right to individual and collective self-defense in the United Nations Charter seemed to extend to all its member states.

As victims of Imperial Japan’s aggressive expansionism during the first half of the 20th century, many countries in the Asian-Pacific region, especially the Republic of China and South Korea, have been wary of the upsurge of Japan’s military potential, and so have paid close attention to any moves of its renewed nationalism.
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