

**Representation of consciousness in first-person autobiographical novels**  
**A case study: Dickens' *Great Expectations* and Thackeray's *Henry Esmond***

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**1. Introduction**

When reading first-person autobiographical novels, the reader needs to be sensitive to 'the internal tension between the self as hero and the self as narrator,' that is, the psychological interaction between 'the experiencing self' and 'the narrating self' (Stanzel, 1984: 212). In first-person autobiographical narratives, however, the reader tends to conflate the narrating self with the experiencing self, overlooking the distance and discrepancy between the two selves (Morini, 2011). Although the two selves are conventionally expressed in the same first person pronoun *I*, these two *I*s share neither the same time and space nor the same knowledge (Galbraith, 1994, 125).

This paper, as a case study, deals with the two Victorian autobiographical novels, Dickens' *Great Expectations* and Thackeray's *Henry Esmond*, and investigates the psychological interaction between the two selves. It particularly focuses on the discourse of the past memorable experiences in which the shifting relations between the two selves is highlighted. On the one hand, I describe how the narrating self represents the consciousness of the experiencing self when he gradually enters into his past experiences, with due attention to not only the shift in point of view but also the interaction of different levels of consciousness, that is, the levels of perception and conception. On the other hand, I attempt to schematize how the reader perceives this gradual shift in narrative perspective as 'the illusion of immediacy' (Stanzel, 1984: 126-127).

As such, this paper demonstrates how and to what extent the narrating self in the two works embodies the past memorable experiences by means of representing the perceptual and conceptual levels of consciousness, with the illusion of immediacy, which makes the reader feel as if the narrating self relives the past experiences in the retrospective narrative.

**2. REMEMBERING schema of autobiographical narrative and its associated features: distance, mode, and perceptibility of narrator**

The relationship between the self as narrator (the narrating self) and the self as protagonist (the experiencing self) in first-person autobiographical novels evokes that between the narrator and the protagonist in third-person novels. However, the crucial difference between them is the narrator's relationship to the protagonist in terms of their ontology and identity (Gunette, 1980: 243-245 Stanzel, 1984: 4-5).

In third-person novels, the identity and the ontological realm of the narrator are different from those of the protagonist in the storyworld. On the contrary, in first-person autobiographical novels, the narrator and the protagonist, who both belong to the storyworld, are the same person in a broad sense since ‘even when a narrator becomes “different person” from the self he describes in his story, his two selves still remain yoked by the first-person pronoun’ (Cohn, 1978: 144). Cohn goes on to say that ‘their relationship imitates the temporal continuity of real beings, an existential relationship that differs substantially from the purely functional relationship that binds a narrator to his protagonist in third-person fiction’ (1978:144). Although there is temporal continuity between the two selves, they become different entities (in terms of space, knowledge and psychology) when they are embodied in the retrospective narrative.

In the first-person retrospective narrative, the present, narrating self (*I* as the narrator) remembers the events which were once experienced by the past, experiencing self (*I* as the protagonist). The way in which the narrating self remembers the past events is variable according to our natural story-telling schema of REMEMBERING, that is, ‘REMEMBERING AS RECOUNTING’ and ‘REMEMBERING AS RELIVING’ (Warner, 2009:17). In fact, in the course of the retrospective narrative, the internal tension prompts the narrating self to shift narrative point of view between the two selves, which leads to the alternation of the REMEMBERING schema between RECOUNTING and RELIVING.

The shift in point of view from the narrating self to experiencing self is ‘almost always gradual and thus usually not apparent to the reader’ (Stanzel, 1984:72). Correspondingly, the alternation process of the REMEMBERING schema from RECOUNTING to RELIVING is gradual and it is accompanied by the gradual transition of distance between the two selves, narrative mode, and perceptibility of narrating self. Distance includes not only the spatio-temporal distance but also perceptual and psychological distance between the two selves (dissociation vs. association). Narrative mode means ‘who or what mediates the story’ (Fludernik, 2009: 37), that is, the narrating self transmits something in words (the narrator’s language) or the events are represented filtered through the consciousness of the experiencing self (the consciousness of the reflector figure) (teller mode vs. reflector mode). Perceptibility indicates degrees of the reader’s perception of the narrating self (overt vs. covert) (Chatman, 1978).

As Figure 1 shows, the shifting relations between the narrating self and the experiencing self parallel those between RECOUNTING and RELIVING, and this is associated with the transition in the continuums of distance, narrative mode, and perceptibility of narrating self.




Figure 1: REMEMBERING schema and its associated features

From the left end of the continuums to the middle range, the narrating self assumes the schema of REMEMBERING AS RECOUNTING and, as a teller of the story (i.e. teller mode), reports, summarizes, conceptualizes and generalizes what he or she experienced in the past with a detached distance from the experiencing self (i.e. dissociation). In this mode, the narrating self often addresses and communicates with the reader. This makes the reader clearly perceive the presence of the narrating self (i.e. overt perceptibility).

Towards the right end of the continuums, the narrating self gradually assumes the schema of REMEMBERING AS RELIVING and closely identifies with the experiencing self (i.e. identification). Here, the mediator of the story (i.e. the narrating self) is replaced in a gradual manner by the consciousness of the experiencing self as the reflector character (i.e. reflector mode). The reflector character, Stanzel argues, ‘mirrors events of the outer world in his consciousness, perceives, feels, registers, but always silently, because he never narrates, that is, he does not verbalize his perceptions, thoughts and feelings in an attempt to communicate them’ (1984: 144). In the reflector mode, in fact, the reader feels as if the past events and experiences were not reported by the narrating self but represented filtered through the consciousness of the experiencing self, that is, without the mediation of the narrating self (i.e. covert perceptibility). This illusion of *immediacy* or ‘the apparent suspension of mediacy’ (Stanzel, 1984: 127) makes the reader be getting into the *now* of the storyworld.

This paper focuses on the gradual process of the REMEMBERING schema from RECOUNTING to RELIVING, that is, how the narrating self gradually enters into the

consciousness of the experiencing self and relives the past experiences by means of representing the different levels of consciousness to embody those experiences more *immediately*.

### 3. Representation of consciousness: two levels of consciousness

Now, I look more closely at what exactly is happening in the schema of REMEMBERING AS RELIVING. As the narrating self enters into the consciousness of the experiencing self, the reader is gradually involved, with the illusion of immediacy, into the storyworld filtered through the consciousness of the experiencing self (Figure 2). Here in the reflector mode of narrative, the reader is invited to see how this consciousness perceives and conceptualizes the past events as they were experienced at that time and thus feel as if the narrating self relives the past experiences in the retrospective narrative.




Figure 2 Representation of consciousness in the retrospective narrative

Critics have long been studying linguistic forms of consciousness representation. Among others, free indirect thought (FIT: Leech and Short, 2007) or represented thought (Banfield, 1982) has attracted much attention in terms of its linguistic features and semantic effects. Within the broader category of FIT, however, those who pay a little attention to ‘the range or depth of a character’s consciousness’ represented in this style (Brinton, 1980: 364) do not make a distinction between the two levels of consciousness, that is, perception (senses) and conception (thought). In fact, perception is often regarded as an aspect of FIT.

Some critics have recognized the distinct narrative technique called ‘represented perception’<sup>1</sup> (Brinton, 1980; Banfield, 1982) to represent a character’s sensory

perceptions of the external world (e.g. sight, hearing, feeling, taste, and smell). They pointed out formal similarities and differences between represented perception and FIT. Both techniques, for example, share such linguistic markers as the past progressive, temporal and spatial expressions from a character's deictic centre, non-embeddable clauses with expressive structures, incomplete sentences, repetitions, whereas in represented perception, unlike FIT, questions and exclamations are not a typical feature and parentheticals with verbs of perception is not allowed (Brinton, 1980: 372-375).

In terms of their semantic difference, Pallares-Garcia, who uses the term 'narrated perception' (NP) for represented perception, notes that 'it [NP] essentially portrays what is happening in the immediate environment of a character, as well as his/her awareness of ongoing bodily sensations and mental state.' FIT, in contrast, 'may represent a wider range of cognitive processes, not necessarily stemming from the character's direct sensory experience of his/her physical reality' (2012: 175). As these semantic differences suggest, both techniques can represent either unreflective or reflective consciousness<sup>2</sup>.

With respect to narrative function, represented perception is distinct from FIT since the former can represent not only the character's consciousness but also the narration of external events (Pallares-Garcia, 2012: 173). This functional difference also makes a distinction between represented perception and pure narration. Although it is often difficult to distinguish these two discourse presentation categories, the former 'lends subjectivity to sight, sound, or smell, for the external world is represented with the coloring which a character's temperament and interests impart'. (Brinton, 1980: 378). Thus, represented perception is different from pure narration in that it lends 'vividness or immediacy to descriptions of the outside world.' (Brinton, 1980: 378).

The primary aim of this paper is not to specify the differences between represented perception and FIT in formal, semantic, and functional terms. It rather focuses on how the interaction between the two levels of consciousness can be represented in the reflector mode of narrative, particularly the discourse of past memorial experiences. In the analyses, I deal with, for example, the submersion of represented perception in FIT and the alternation between represented perception and FIT (cf. Fehr, 1938:101-103). In doing so, this paper demonstrates how these two techniques make a coherent style to embody the perceptual and conceptual levels of experience.

#### **4. Discourse of memorable experience in *Great Expectations***

The first example below is from Chapter 1 of *Great Expectations*<sup>3</sup>. This passage appears just before Pip's first encounter with Magwitch ("Hold your noise!" cried a terrible voice...'). Here the narrating self (the adult Pip) is about to remember this first memorable and traumatic experience, gradually shifting the REMEMBERING schema

from RECOUNTING to RELIVING with the withdrawal of his presence, that is, gradually getting close to and entering into the consciousness of the experiencing self (the child Pip) with the illusion of immediacy.

(i) Ours was the marsh country, down by the river, within, as the river wound, twenty miles of the sea. (ii) My first most vivid and broad impression of the identity of things, seems to me to have been gained on a memorable raw afternoon towards evening. (iii) At such a time I found out for certain, that this bleak place overgrown with nettles was the churchyard; and that Philip Pirrip, late of this parish, and also Georgiana wife of the above, were dead and buried; and that Alexander, Bartholomew, Abraham, Tobias, and Roger, infant children of the aforesaid, were also dead and buried; and that the dark flat wilderness beyond the churchyard, intersected with dykes and mounds and gates, with scattered cattle feeding on it, was the marshes; and that the low leaden line beyond, was the river; and that the distant savage lair from which the wind was rushing, was the sea; and that the small bundle of shivers growing afraid of it all and beginning to cry, was Pip.

“Hold your noise!” cried a terrible voice...(*Great Expectations*, 3-4)<sup>4</sup>

In sentence (i) and (ii), the reader clearly perceives the presence of the narrating self who, as a teller of the story, implicitly introduces the spatial and temporal settings of the traumatic events that follows. The epistemic verb “seems” with the present tense in sentence (ii) also suggests to the reader that his memory is still somewhat ambiguous. This hazy state of mind is retained in the generalised temporal expression (‘at such a time’) rather than the specific one (e.g. *at that time, then*) in the main clause of sentence (iii). However, here at the same time, the epistemic phrase ‘for certain’ is likely to function as an opener for removing the haziness and getting into the immediate environment of ‘a memorable raw afternoon towards evening’. Thus in a subtle way, the narrating self switches the REMEMBERING schema from RECOUNTING to RELIVING as well as the narrative mode from the teller mode to the reflector mode.

In fact, within the following embedded that-clauses, the narrating self is recalling and reliving the past event filtered through the consciousness of the experiencing self. Here the process of the child Pip’s ‘identity of things’ is mirrored in the word order in which the same pattern of linguistic structures is repeated seven times:

The child Pip's perceptions	Conceptualization of perception
This bleak place overgrown with nettles	the churchyard
Philip Pirrip, late of this parish, and also Georgiana wife of the above	dead and buried
Alexander, Bartholomew, Abraham, Tobias, and Roger, infant children of the aforesaid	dead and buried
the dark flat wilderness beyond the churchyard...	the marshes
the low leaden line beyond	the river
The distant savage lair from which the wind was rushing	the sea
The small bundle of shivers growing afraid of it all and beginning to cry	Pip

Figure 3 the child Pip's perception and its conceptualization

Listed in the left column in the table are the child Pip's immediate perceptions of the external world (except for the last one), while listed in the right column are the conceptualizations of these perceptions, that is, the understanding and realization of his surrounding phenomenon. The word order thus mirrors our natural process of conceptualization (i.e. perception leads to conception) which the narrating self called 'identity of things'.

The linguistic forms used in the left column share the common features of represented perception and FIT: e.g. the expressions from the child Pip's deictic centre including the place deixis (*this* bleak place) and the directly quoted epitaphs (e.g. *Philip Pirrip, late of this parish, and also Georgiana wife of the above*); the past progressive (the distant savage lair from which the wind *was rushing*); participial adjectives indicating ongoing mental states (the small bundle of shivers *growing* afraid of it all and *beginning* to cry). Although these linguistic elements are used in the embedded that-clauses, they represent the perceptual level of the child Pip's consciousness while backgrounding the presence of the narrating self. Semantically, these descriptions of the child Pip's 'identity of things' render his consciousness ranging from perception to conception. In this sense, these representations of the child Pip's consciousness might be comprised of either represented perception or FIT.

However, most of the words (except for the deictic expressions) used in these clauses are not likely to be attributed to the experiencing self, but rather to the narrating self, given that the child Pip did not have a high level of literacy at the time. Here, the narrating self articulates the child Pip's inarticulate state of perception of the external world,

particularly, by means of metaphorical expressions ('the dark flat wilderness', 'the low leaden line', 'the distant savage lair'). Those metaphors allow the reader to make sense of the immediate environment in terms of the child Pip's own perceptions. This may, in turn, create the illusion of immediacy by foregrounding the meanings of the words (i.e. the child Pip's immediate perceptions) while backgrounding the forms of the words (i.e. the expressions articulated by the narrating self).

It is important to note that while the metaphorical expressions like 'the low leaden line' and 'the distant savage lair' portray the child Pip's external perceptions of the landscape, the one used in the last clause ('the small bundle of shivers growing afraid of it all and beginning to cry') represents the internal perception of his bodily and mental state. In fact, the object of conceptualization in the last clause is the child Pip himself, who is expressed in not the first person pronoun *I* but the third person reference *Pip*. The use of the third person reference indicates the child Pip's metacognition, the objective realisation of his immediate identity as being small, solitary and surrounded by imminent danger.

Thus the narrating self embodies the past traumatic experience by entering into the consciousness of the experiencing self while effacing his presence to create the illusion of immediacy. It is also noticeable that all these descriptions filtered through the consciousness of the child Pip provide the geographical setting of the event as well as his unstable psychological state and thus subtly functions as the introduction of the story that follows: "'Hold your noise!" cried a terrible voice... ' (4) (Cf. the function of represented perception: the narration of the external events).

In the last paragraph of Chapter 1, the child Pip's perceiving consciousness is foregrounded again to represent his immediate experience of the surrounding world:

(i)The marshes were just a long black horizontal line then, as I stopped to look after him; and the river was just another horizontal line, not nearly so broad nor yet so black; and the sky was just a row of long angry red lines and dense black lines intermixed. (ii) On the edge of the river I could faintly make out the only two black things in all the prospect that seemed to be standing upright; one of these was the beacon by which the sailors steered—like an unhooped cask upon a pole—an ugly thing when you were near it; the other, a gibbet with some chains hanging to it which had once held a pirate. (iii)The man was limping on towards this latter, as if he were the pirate come to life, and come down, and going back to hook himself up again. (iv) It gave me a terrible turn when I thought so; and as I saw the cattle lifting their heads to gaze after him, I wondered whether they thought so too. (v) I looked all round for the horrible young man, and could see no signs of him. (vi) But now I was frightened again, and ran home without stopping. (*Great Expectations*, 7)



This passage appears after Pip takes leave of Magwitch. In sentence (i), the word order is the reverse of that in the last example. The narrating self seems to employ this reverse word order to reflect the child Pip's reconceptualization process of the marshes, the river, and the sky. After Pip encounters Magwitch, the view of the landscape becomes more of an immediate reality for him. This immediateness is reflected in the repeated use of *just*, which indicates either the literal sense (exactly) or the temporal sense (at this time). The consciousness represented here is more reflective than that in the last example. In fact, the emotional adjective *angry* is likely to reflect either the child Pip's perceptual or conceptual level of consciousness.

In sentence (ii) the child Pip's visual perception of 'the only two black things' seems to be rendered in represented perception, which, in turn, seems to be submerged in FIT. Here, the verb phrase 'make out' can function as a perception indicator (Fehr, 1938: 99-101) and the past progressive '...seemed to be standing' also indicates that the narrating self is close to the now of the storyworld. After the semi-colon, the child Pip's visual field is represented with his reflective thought. The simile expression "like" indicates the child Pip's reflective perception of the beacon (cf. Brinton, 1980: 377). Furthermore, after the dash, Pip's emotional reaction to the beacon (an ugly thing) might be rendered in FIT since the second person *you* used here can be used in the sense of *one* or possibly *I* (i.e. the child Pip) (cf. Galbraith, 1994:140). Sentence (iii) is clearly an example of represented perception in terms of the use of the past progressive (the man *was limping*...) and the simile expression 'as if' also indicates the ghost-like figure of Magwitch is reflected in the child Pip's perceiving consciousness.

In sentence (iv) and (v), the child Pip's visual perception still dominates the narrative with reflective thought. Until the last sentence (vi), the narrating self retains the child Pip's point of view as indicated in the use of the past tense with the deictic *now*.

As the two examples shows, the embodiment of the child Pip's memorable experience is demonstrated by representing the interaction of the two levels of consciousness with the illusion of immediacy.

## **5. Discourse of memorable experience in *Henry Esmond***

*Henry Esmond* is quite an unconventional first-person autobiographical novel in terms of pronominal reference to the two selves. In *Great Expectations* and other conventional autobiographical novels, both the narrating self and the experiencing self are usually expressed in the same first-person pronoun *I*. However in *Henry Esmond*, while the narrating self is expressed in the first person, the experiencing self is for the most part expressed in the third person reference.

This is clearly evident from the beginning of the story. Chapter 1 begins as follows:

When Francis, fourth Viscount Castlewood, came to his title, and presently after to take possession of his house of Castlewood, county Hants, in the year 1691, almost the only tenant of the place besides the domestics was a lad of twelve years of age, of whom no one seemed to take any note until my lady viscountess lighted upon him, going over house, with the house keeper on the day of her arrival. The boy was in the room known as the book room, or yellow gallery[...]

The new and fair lady of Castlewood found the sad lonely little occupant of this gallery busy over his great book, which he laid down when he was aware that a stranger was at hand. And, knowing who that person must be, the lad stood up and bowed before her, performing a shy obeisance to the mistress of his house [...]

‘My name is Henry Esmond,’ said the lad, looking up at her in a sort of delight and wonder, for she had come upon him as a *Dea certé*, and appeared the most charming object he had ever looked on. Her golden hair was shining in the gold of the sun; her complexion was of a dazzling bloom; her lips smiling, and her eyes beaming with a kindness which made Harry Esmond’s heart to beat with surprise. (*Henry Esmond*, 16-17)

For some readers, this opening passage can look like a third-person novel, since the narrating self (the adult Henry) uses various third-person references (e.g. *a lad*, *the boy*, *the sad lonely little occupant*, *he*) to the experiencing self (the child Henry). This first- and third-person pronominal references makes the reader aware of the distance between the two selves throughout the story (cf. the distance between the narrator and the character in the third-person novel). However, this distance varies according the alternation of the REMEMBERING schema between RECOUNTING and RELIVING.

In this opening, the narrating self remembers and recounts his childhood memory on the arrival of the new Viscount family to the house of Castlewood. In the passage, the distance between the two selves are retained due to, particularly, the third-person references to the experiencing self, but it gradually diminishes as the narrating self recalls his memorable event of the first meeting with his new mistress. Accordingly, the REMEMBERING schema is subtly switched from RECOUNTING to RELIVING.

In the third paragraph in the example, the narrating self renders all the descriptions of her goddess-like appearance through the child Henry’s visual perception with his emotional attachment to her. Here, the verb phrases like “looked up” and “looked on” function as the perception indicators and the past progressive (e.g. ‘Her golden hair *was shining...*’) indicates the simultaneity of the event. This ongoing perception is reinforced by the ellipsis of *were* in the past progressive (her lips *smiling*, and her eyes *beaming...*), although this immediacy is interrupted in the last relative clause in which the third-person

reference appears (...which made Harry Esmond's heart to beat with surprise). In represented perception, like the example of *Great Expectations*, the narrating self articulates inarticulate state of the child Henry's perception and its associated emotion while backgrounding his presence from the narrative. Even though the third-person reference makes a distance between the two selves, represented perception contributes to creating the illusion of immediacy and thus representing the immediate experience of the child Henry.

In *Henry Esmond*, the shift in the REMEMBERING schema from RECOUNTING to RELIVING can cause the alternation of the first-and third-person pronominal reference to the experiencing self. The following passage is the young Henry's memorable visit to the cemetery in which his mother, whom he has never met, is buried:

(i) Esmond came to this spot in one sunny evening of spring, and saw, amidst a thousand black crosses, casting their shadows across the grassy mounds, that particular one which marked his mother's resting-place [...] (ii) He fancied her in tears and darkness, kneeling at the foot of her cross, under which her cares were buried. (iii) Surely he knelt down, and said his own prayer there, not in sorrow so much as in awe (for even his memory had no recollection of her), and in pity for the pangs which the gentle soul in life had been made to suffer. (iv) To this cross she brought them; for this heavenly bridegroom she exchanged the husband who had wooed her, the traitor who had left her. (v) A thousand such hillocks lay round about, the gentle daisies springing out of the grass over them, and each bearing its cross and requiescat. (vi) A nun, veiled in black, was kneeling hard by, at a sleeping sister's bedside (so fresh made, that the spring had scarce had time to spin a coverlid for it); beyond the cemetery walls you had glimpses of life and the world, and the spires and gables of the city. (vii) A bird came down from a roof opposite, and lit first on a cross, and then on the grass below it, whence it flew away presently with a leaf in its mouth: then came a sound as of chanting, from the chapel of the sisters hard by; others had long since filled the place, which poor Mary Magdalene once had there, were kneeling at the same stall, and hearing the same hymns and prayers in which her stricken heart had found consolation. (viii) Might she sleep in peace—might she sleep in peace; and we, too, when our struggles and pains are over! But the earth is the Lord's as the heaven is; we are alike His creatures here and yonder. (ix) I took a little flower off the hillock, and kissed it, and went my way, like the bird that had just lighted on the cross by me, back into the world again. (x) Silent receptacle of death! tranquil depth of calm, out of reach of tempest and trouble! (xi) I felt as one who had been walking below the sea, and treading amidst the bones of shipwrecks. (*Henry Esmond*, 277-278)

From sentence (i) to sentence (iii), the reader clearly perceives the presence of the narrating self because he recalls the past event retaining the third-person reference to the experiencing self. In sentence (i), there is a distance between the two selves in terms of the pronominal reference, but the point of view of the narrating self seems to be placed in the past cemetery scene, in the light of the use of the deictic verb *came* (not *went*) and the proximal deictic *this* (not the distal deictic *that*): ‘Esmond came to this spot in one sunny evening of spring...’. It is ambiguous whether this pictorial description of the cemetery is filtered through the visual perception of the young Henry. Here, the narrating self seems to flow the schema of REMEMBERING between RECOUNTING and RELIVING.

From sentence (ii) to (iv), the narrating self begins to describe his past state of mind evoked by ‘his mother’s resting-place’, gradually empathising with the experiencing self and then gradually entering into his past consciousness (e.g. the proximal deixis *this* in ‘to this cross’ in sentence (iv)), although the reader still clearly perceives his presence in the parenthetical comment: ‘(for even his memory had no recollection of her)’. Sentence (v) is likely to be represented perception, since the participle construction (...the gentle daisies *springing* out of the grass over them, and each *bearing* its cross and requiescat) possibly indicates the young Henry’s ongoing perception of the external world. Until the semi-colon in sentence (vi), the narrating self clearly uses represented perception (e.g. the use of past progressive: ‘A nun, veiled in black, *was kneeling* hard by...’) to foreground the young Henry’s immediate perception of the cemetery, which in fact haunts the overall passage in this example. It is noticeable here that reflective thought associated with his perception is inserted in the parenthetical:(so fresh made, that the spring had scarce had time to spin a coverlid for it), although it is ambiguous whether this comment is attributed to the narrating self or the experiencing self. After the semi-colon in sentence (iv), the narrating self uses the second person reference *you* to her mother to enter into the young Henry’s conceptual level of consciousness. In sentence (vii), his perceptual level of consciousness is foregrounded again in represented perception with its associated reflective thought.

In sentence (viii), the narrating self is deeply immersed in the young Henry’s conceptual level of consciousness, which is clearly represented in FIT (“Might she sleep in peace—might she sleep in peace”). Furthermore, it seems to be followed by FDT (free direct thought) as indicated by the first-person plural *we* and the present tense.

In sentence (ix), it occurs not only the shift in tense from the present to the past but also the shift in the pronominal reference to the young Henry from the third person to the first person *I*. The temporal shift again makes the reader feel the distance between the two selves but the pronominal shift indicates that the narrating self still attaches to the

experiencing self and relives the past experience. In fact, in sentence (x), the young Henry's mental cries are rendered in FIT (or possibly FDT), although the poetic expressions used here can be attributable to the narrating self. The first person reference is still retained in sentence (xi) in which the narrating self again articulate the young Henry's inarticulate state of his perception of the cemetery.

Overall, in this example, it is true that the reader feels more or less the presence of the narrating self, particularly when he uses the third person references and articulates the young Henry's perceptions and thoughts. However, it is also true that the illusion of immediacy is heightened by not only the shifts in the pronominal reference to the experiencing self from the third person, through the first-person plural, to the first person reference, but also the alternation between represented perception and FIT.

### **5. Conclusion: Embodiment of perceptual and conceptual levels of experience**

Although this paper only deal with a few passage from the two Victorian first-person autobiographical novels, it demonstrates that when the narrating self enters into the consciousness of the experiencing self and relives past experiences, the two levels of consciousness and their process of interaction are skillfully represented, particularly in represented perception and FIT. What I want to emphasize here is that each narrative technique is, as Briton (1980:363) argues, 'complementary parts of one coherent style' to embody the perceptual and conceptual levels of past experiences. The more these techniques of consciousness representation are effectively used, the more the reader is deeply immersed in the reality of the storyworld with the illusion of immediacy.

## Notes

1. Other names for this narrative technique are, for example, ‘substitutionary perception’ (Fehr, 1937), ‘narrated perception’ (Cohn, 1978; Fludernik, 1993; Pallares-Garcia, 2012).
2. Although Banfield (1982) defines represented perception as non-reflective consciousness and represented thought as reflective consciousness, Brinton argues that represented perception can represent reflective consciousness by showing some counterexamples (e.g. the use of exclamations in represented perception). FIT can also represent unreflective consciousness since ‘it allows the expression of a character’s unarticulated, unexpressed, or unconscious thoughts’ (1980: 369).
3. For the analysis of the example, I am greatly indebted to Galbraith (1994) and Leech (2007). They made a narratological and stylistic analysis of this famous passage and discussed, for example, how the narrating self represents the child Pip’s process of “identity of things” with linguistic devices such as the use of unusual word orders, the child’s Pip’s deictic expressions and metaphors. Galbraith (1994) particularly focuses on how the shifting relations between the two selves are rendered in consciousness representation.
4. For ease of reference, I have numbered the sentences of the following examples.

## Acknowledgements

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## Texts

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